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Abstract. Ontology alignments enable interoperability between het-
erogeneous information resources. The Alignment Repair Game (ARG)
specifically provides a way for agents to simultaneously communicate
and improve the alignment when a communication failure occurs. This
is achieved through applying adaptation operators that provide a revi-
sion strategy for agents to resolve failures with minimum information
loss. In this paper, we explore how closely these operators resemble log-
ical dynamics. We develop a variant of Dynamic Epistemic Logic called
DEOL to capture the dynamics of ARG by modeling ontologies as knowl-
edge and alignments as belief with respect to the plausibility relation.
The dynamics of ARG are then achieved through announcements and
conservative upgrades. With the representation of ARG in DEOL, we
formally establish the limitations and the redundancy of the adaptation
operators. More precisely, that for a complete logical reasoner, replace,
addjoin and refine are redundant for one or both agents in the game
and that add would be replaced by addjoin in all cases.
Keywords: Ontology alignment · Alignment repair · Dynamic Epis-
temic Logic
1 Introduction
Ontology alignments are a widely-used tool to facilitate interoperability while
preserving heterogeneity of information [7]. Ontology matching is the process
of determining the correspondences of the alignment. Many different matching
algorithms have been developed [13]. These do however not suffice in any realistic
context of multi-agent systems where agents have access to different ontologies
and are required to communicate with incomplete alignments or ontologies may
be adopted to new information in the environment. This requires a dynamic
view on matching algorithms instead of the originally static approach where the
alignment is determined initially and provided as input to the communicating
agents.
The dynamic perspective has led to various proposals for ontology match-
ing on multi-agent systems. Amongst others: gossiping [1], logical repair [12]
and conservativity principles [9]. These proposals have been integrated within
multi-agent systems via specific protocols [1,10]. In this paper, we focus on a
specific approach to the dynamic perspective to evolve alignments through their
use: the Alignment Repair Game (ARG) [5,6]. In this approach, which is based
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on ideas of cultural evolution [14], agents communicate and overcome failures
in communication (due to an incorrect correspondence) by repairing the align-
ment. This repair is done via adaptation operators that specify how agents adopt
their knowledge in case of an incorrect correspondence with minimum informa-
tion loss. Because this repair is executed during communication, ARG avoids
the problematic assumption that alignments need to be determined before any
communication can take place.
In this paper we explore the connection between the adaptation operators
and logical dynamics. We introduce a variant of Dynamic Epistemic Logic called
Dynamic Epistemic Ontology Logic (DEOL) to capture the dynamics of ARG
by modeling ontologies as knowledge and alignments as belief with respect to
the plausibility relation. This logic is an extension of work on Modal Description
Logics, see [3] for more information. The communication in ARG is achieved
through announcements and conservative upgrades. With this representation of
ARG in DEOL, we formally establish the limitations and the redundancy of the
adaptation operators in failing to capture all the available information in ARG
and supplying information that is already known or believed by agents. More
precisely, that for a complete logical reasoner, the adaptation operators replace,
addjoin and refine are redundant for one or both agents in the game and that
adaptation operator add would be replaced by addjoin to preserve consistency.
Even though these results do heavily rely on the reasoning capacities of agents,
they do not depend on any specific feature of the representation in DEOL. In
fact, any logic whose ontology semantics is that of OWL will guarantee the
results.
That said, the precise proposal in this paper has its own limitations. We
use strong requirements on DEOL models that facilitate some form of maximal
consistency over the interpretation function for classes. Furthermore, our focus is
that of a logical understanding of ARG and hence a detailed investigation of the
specific properties and validities of the proposed logic still remains to complete.
2 Alignment Repair Game
An ontology typically provides a vocabulary of a domain of interest and a spec-
ification of the meaning of terms in that vocabulary via semantic relations such
as specialization (Ď), equivalence (”), exclusion (‘) and membership (P) [7].
Formally, an ontology is a knowledge base (a TBox) in description logic. For
precise definitions, consult [2].
The intuition we use in this paper is that an ontology is a quintuple O “
xD, C,Ď,‘, Py where D is a set of object names, C is a non-empty set of class
names, Ď,”,‘ Ď CˆC are the semantic relations and P Ď DˆC is the member-
ship relation. To give meaning to these relations an interpretation I “ x∆, ¨Iy is
given for an ontology O that provides a domain ∆ and a function ¨I assigning to
objects o P D an interpretation in the domain ∆ and to each class C P C a set of
objects of the domain [7]. We then say that “C is subsumed by D” (C Ď D) iff
CI Ď DI , “C and D are equivalent” (C ” D) iff C Ď D and D Ď C and “C and
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D are disjoint” (C ‘D) iff CI XDI “ H. Lastly we say that “o is a member
of C” (o P C) iff oI P CI . For two classes C,D that are not disjoint we also
write C  D and in each ontology J is the class such that JI “ ∆. From classes
C,D, we also form the classes C\D, C[D and  C that represent their union,
intersection and complement. To denote an ontology (without an interpretation)
we also say the signature of an ontology. The signature of O “ xD, C,Ď,‘, Py is
the set of class names C P C and object names o P D, without any specification
of the relations that hold between them.
An alignment Aab between two ontologies Oa, Ob is a set of correspondences
between classes of the two ontologies [7]. Such a correspondence is a triple
xCa, Cb, Ry where Ca, Cb are classes of Oa,Ob, respectively, and R P tĎ,Ě,”,‘u
is a semantic relation that is asserted to hold between Ca and Cb. We also write
CaRCb for xCa, Cb, Ry.
The Alignment Repair Game (ARG) is a game designed for artificial agents
to evolve alignments between their ontologies through their use [5,6]. In ARG,
agents are given individual (private) ontologies, a set of randomly generated
(possibly incorrect) alignments and a common domain. Each round of ARG is
played privately between two agents and is described in Definition 1. The aim of
ARG is to improve communication between agents by repairing the alignment
when failures occur. Through application of the adaptation operators the align-
ment between the ontologies evolves and converges towards a state closer to the
reference alignment, the maximal truthful alignment between the ontologies that
serves to determine the performance of the operators. Note that the reference
alignment is not available to the agents themselves.
For simplicity, in ARG it is assumed that the objects of the domain are
described by a finite set of Boolean features (more specifically, by the presence
or absence of each feature) and that ontologies are strict hierarchies in which each
level adds one constraint (positive or negative) related to exactly one feature.
This means that classes not in subsumption relation are disjoint. Ontologies
are assumed to be incomplete by having one level less than the environment has
features and classes in the ontology correspond to the conjunction of the features
of its ancestors. For instance, the bottom-leftmost class in Example 1 is defined
by Squarea [ Smalla.
Definition 1 (Alignment Repair Game (ARG)). The Alignment Repair
Game (ARG) is played by a set of agents A with a common domain D of objects.
Each agent a P A is associated with an ontology Oa, an interpretation Ia for this
ontology and a randomly generated set of shared alignments Aab is given between
any two ontologies Oa, Ob that at least includes Ja ” Jb. We write Doi P Oi for
the most specific class (Ď-wise) of object o P D available in Oi and we assume
that Doa, D
o
b are not part of the initial alignment.
At each round of the game:
1. Two agents a, b P A and an object o P ∆ are picked at random.
2. Agent a asks agent b to which class the object o belongs and agent b answers
Cb P Ob s.t. Dob Ď Cb and CaRCb P Aab with R P tĚ,”u.
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3. Agent a compares Ca (CaRCb P Aab) with Doa.
4. If Doa Ď Ca belongs to Oa then the round is a success.
5. Else (then by construction Doa‘Ca belongs to Oa) the round is a failure and
an adaptation operator is applied to the alignment Aab.
ARG consists of a fixed number of rounds as described above for a chosen op-
erator and then the alignments are compared to the reference alignments. By
playing ARG with different operators, their effects can be compared.
Note that because of the assumptions that we imposed on our ontologies, the
most specific class Doa of object o in ontology Oa is always unique. For an intu-
ition, consider the following example.
Example 1. Let agent a and agent b play ARG where their ontologies Oa and
Ob are described in Figure 1 with the domain ∆ “ t˝,4, ,N,˝,4,,Nu. The
initial alignment Aab is represented by the dotted red correspondences between
classes of their ontologies. Now, if the object N is drawn in a round, this round
will be considered a success, whereas the object 4 would yield a failure and an
adaptation operator will be applied.
Ja
Oa
Smalla Largea
Ď Ď
‘
Squarea Trianglea
N,4
Ď Ď
‘
Squarea Trianglea
Ď Ď
‘
Jb
Ob
Blackb Whiteb
Ď Ď
‘
Smallb
N
Largeb
Ď Ď
‘
Smallb
4
Largeb
Ď Ď
‘
”
”
Fig. 1: The ontologies (black) of agent a (left) and agent b (right) and the align-
ment (red, dashed) between them of Example 1.
The repair in case of a failure is performed via adaptation operators [5,6]. These
operators provide a strategy for the agents to revise the failed correspondence.
Definition 2 (Adaptation Operator). We have the following Adaptation
Operators for ARG (for a schematic view of the effect of the operators, refer to
Figure 2):
– delete: delete the initial correspondence;
– replace: replace the initial correspondence by Ca Ď Cb;
– add: in addition to replace, add a Ď-correspondence between Cb and the
immediate superclass C 1a of Ca: Cb Ď C 1a;
– addjoin: in addition to replace, add a Ď-correspondence between Cb and
the lowest superclass C 1a of Ca that is compatible with Doa (i.e. Doa Ď C 1a):
Cb Ď C 1a;
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– refine: in addition to replace, add Ď-correspondences between the sub-
classes C 1b of Cb that do not subsume the actual class of the object (i.e.
Dob Ę C 1b): C 1b Ď Ca;
– refadd: the combination of addjoin and refine.
Note that the order of the actions that are performed by the adaptation operators
does not matter.
Ja
Ď Ď
K
Da
Ď
Ca
Ď
o
Jb
Cb
Ď
Ď
Db
Ď Ď
K
”
Ď
(replace)
Ě (add)
Ě (addjoin)
Ě (refine)
Fig. 2: Schematic diagram of the deleted (red) and added correspondences (blue,
green) by the different the adaptation operators in ARG [5,6].
3 Dynamic Epistemic Ontology Logic
We model the game in a version of Dynamic Epistemic Logic where the proposi-
tions are elements of a Description Logic language: object classifications (Cpxq)
and class relations (C ” D, C Ď D and C ‘D). We call this extension (multi-
agent) Dynamic Epistemic Ontology Logic (DEOL).
Definition 3 (Syntax of DEOL). The syntax of (multi-agent) DEOL is de-
fined in the following way.
φ ::“ Cpxq | Jpxq | CRD | φ^ ψ |  φ | Kiφ | Biφ | r†φsψ
R P tĎ,”,‘u, † P t!, Òu
Where C,J P C, Ki and Bi are the knowledge and belief operators for each agent
i, †φ with † P t!, Òu are dynamic upgrades and x is a variable.
The connectives Ñ and _ and the duals Kˆi, Bˆi, x†φy are defined in the usual
way. Models of DEOL are plausibility models.
Definition 4 (DEOL Model). A model of (multi-agent) DEOL is a 6-tuple
M “ xW, pěiqiPA, w˚, ∆, Iy where
– W is the set of states, or worlds;
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– pěiqiPA are the plausibility relations on W , one for each agent, that are
converse well-founded, locally connected preorders;
– w˚ is the actual world;
– ∆ is the domain of interpretation (a set of objects);
– and I is an interpretation function that assigns to each state w a function
¨Iw interpreting each class name C P C as a set of objects of the domain of
interpretation, i.e. CIw Ď ∆, such that JIw “ ∆, pC [DqIw “ CIw XDIw
and p CqIw “ ∆ z CIw for each w PW .
We also write C \D for the class defined by  p C [ Dq, [tCiu for the class
defined by C1[C2[. . . and \tCiu for the class defined by C1\C2\. . ., and their
interpretations at w are given by CIw YDIw , ŞCIwi and ŤCIwi , respectively. In
each DEOL model K :“  J is the empty class.
The plausibility relation w ěi v reads as “w is at least as plausible as v for
agent i”. From this, we can define the epistemic and doxastic relations on W as
follows:
w „i v :“ w pďi Y ěiq v (1)
w Ñi v :“ v PMaxďiwpiq (2)
Where wpiq :“ tv PW | w „i vu is the information cell of agent i at state w. It
follows from the properties of ďi and ěi that the relations „i are reflexive, tran-
sitive and symmetric, and the relations Ñi are transitive, serial and Euclidean.
Therefore they satisfy the usual properties of knowledge and belief, respectively.
Definition 5 (Semantics of DEOL). The semantics of DEOL is defined in
the following way:
– M, w ( Cpxq iff x P CIw
– M, w ( C Ď D iff CIw Ď DIw
– M, w ( C ” D iff CIw “ DIw
– M, w ( C ‘D iff CIw XDIw “ H
– M, w ( φ^ ψ iff M, w ( φ and M, w ( ψ
– M, w (  φ iff M, w * φ
– M, w ( Kiφ iff @v s.t. w „i v: M, v ( φ
– M, w ( Biφ iff @v s.t. w Ñi v: M, v ( φ
– M, w ( r!φsψ iff M!φ, w ( ψ
– M, w ( rÒ φsψ iff MÒφ, w ( ψ
Where !φ and Ò φ act as model transformers !φ :“MÑM!φ and Ò φ :“MÑ
MÒφ in the following ways, where ||φ||M :“ tw PW | M, w |ù φu:
– Announcement !φ: Delete all ‘ φ’-worlds from the model. I.e. W !φ “
||φ||M and w ě!φi v iff w ěi v and w, v P W !φ. w˚, ∆, C and I remain
unchanged;
– Conservative upgrade Ò φ: Change the plausibility orders so that the best
‘φ’-worlds become better than all other worlds, while the old ordering on
the rest of the worlds remains. I.e. W Òφ “ W and w ěÒφi v iff either v P
MaxďipwpiqX ||φ||Mq or w ěi v. Again, w˚, ∆, C and I remain unchanged.
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The intuition behind these transformations is that the trustworthiness of new
information may vary: whereas an announcement is considered as new informa-
tion from an infallible source, conservative upgrades consider information from
sources that are trusted, but that are not infallible. Precisely for this reason con-
servative upgrades only change the plausibility of worlds without deleting any
alternatives.
Note that in both cases w˚ remains the actual world of the model. This also
means that an announcement !φ can only be validly performed on a model M if
φ is true is the actual world w˚. For more technical details about announcements
and conservative upgrades consult [11,4,15,16].
4 ARG Dynamics
We now formalize ARG in DEOL and model the changes in the epistemic-
doxastic state of the agents by means of upgrades. The DEOL model M that
describes the initial epistemic-doxastic states of the agents satisfies the following
conditions:
– The ontology Oa is known to agent a. That is, the sentences of DEOL that
describe Oa are true in any world accessible by a from the actual world w˚
via „a;
– The alignment Aab between two ontologies is believed by agents a, b. That is,
the sentences of DEOL that describe Aab are true in any worlds accessible
by a, b from the actual world w˚ via Ña, Ñb;
– The signatures of every agent’s ontology is known to every agent (public
signature assumption).
For instance, in Example 1 the sentences of DEOL describing ontology Oa
are pSquarea [ Smallaq Ď Smalla, Smalla Ď Ja, Trianglea [ SmallapNq,
Trianglea[Smallap4q, pTrianglea[Smallaq Ď Smalla, etc, and the sentences
describing the alignment Aab are Smalla ” Blacka and Ja ” Jb.
To satisfy the public signature assumption, we require that for each two
classes C,D in any other agent’s ontology that do not appear in the alignment,
agent a considers all combinations of the following alternatives equally plausible
(for each o P ∆):
– Cpoq /  Cpoq
– Dpoq /  Dpoq
– C ” D / C ı D
– C Ď D / C Ę D
– C Ě D / C Ğ D
– C ‘D / C  D
This is achieved in models of DEOL by ultimately making as many copies of
the worlds describing an agent’s knowledge of her own ontology and belief of
alignments involving her ontology as there are combinations of the alternatives
above, ranking them all equally plausible while respecting the order imposed
by the alignments. Such a model very rapidly explodes and therefore we often
only draw the epistemic-doxastic states of agents. Note that to satisfy the public
signature assumption the first requirement already takes care of agents’ own
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Ja
SmallaLargea
Squarea [ Smalla
Trianglea [ Largea
Squarea [ Largea
Trianglea [ Smalla
N, 4
Jb
Ob
Blackb Whiteb
Ď Ď
‘
Smallb
N
Largeb
Ď Ď
‘
Smallb
4
Largeb
Ď Ď
‘
”
”
Ď
Ě
Ď
Ě
Ě
‘
‘
‘
Ď
Fig. 3: Initial knowledge (solid black lines) and belief (dashed red lines) of agent
b in Example 1.
signature and the second requirement of classes appearing in the alignment. In
Figure 3, the epistemic-doxastic state of agent b in Example 1 is given.
As a result, both ontologies and alignments are captured in the epistemic-
doxastic states of agents in the DEOL model. However, now that agents can
reason logically, there is more. Agents can combine their knowledge and beliefs to
obtain new beliefs. For instance, KapCapoqq and BapCa ” Cbq entails BapCbpoqq,
etc. In other words, everything agent a knows about Ca P Oa she also believes
about Cb P Ob whenever Ca ” Cb is part of the alignment Aab, i.e. whenever
she believes that Ca and Cb are the same. This is already satisfied in the DEOL
model by the closure properties of the interpretation function.
During ARG new information is learned. There are two dynamic acts involved
in the learning: the communication of Cbpoq in step 2 of ARG and the adaptation
operator applied in step 5 (see Definition 1). How do these acts change the
knowledge and beliefs of the agents? And are the adaptation operators as defined
by [5,6] necessary to account for these changes?
In order to answer these questions, we formalize the communication acts in
ARG with the dynamic upgrades available in our model: announcements !φ and
conservative upgrades Ò φ.
Definition 6 (ARG Dynamics in DEOL). We model each round of ARG
as defined in Definition 1 by
!Cbpoq; if Doa ‘ Ca then operator (3)
Where operator denotes the applicable operator and Doa was defined as the
actual (most specific) class of o P ∆ in Oa.
It is clear that the communication of the class of the object should be captured
by a announcement. Step 3 of ARG is then the model transformation induced
by !Cbpoq: M to M!Cbpoq. Yet, for the adaptation operators, announcements are
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not the right tool: these are a form of a revision policy and tell the agents how
to change the alignment upon a failure in communication. Therefore the effect
of the operators should not take place at the level of knowledge but at the level
of belief. For this we use conservative upgrades.
Definition 7 (Adaptation Operators as Dynamic Modalities). Given the
failure of the correspondence Cb Ď Cap^ Cb Ě Caq P Aab, we can model the
dynamics of the adaptation operators in the following way (recall that Doa was
defined as the actual (most specific) class of o P ∆ in Oa):
– replace: Ò pCa Ğ Cbq
– add: Ò pCa Ğ Cb ^ Cb Ď Csupa q
– addjoin: Ò pCa Ğ Cb ^ Cb Ď CsupDa q
– refine: Ò pCa Ğ Cb ^\Csubb Ď Caq
– refadd: Ò pCa Ğ Cb ^ Cb Ď CsupDa ^\Csubb Ď Caq
Where Csupa “ MinĎtC P Oa | Ca Ď Cu, CsupDa “ MinĎtC P Oa | Ca Ĺ
C^Da Ď Cu (and by construction of the ontologies, Csupa and CsupDa are unique)
and Csubb “ tCsubb P Ob | Csubb Ď Cb ^Dob Ę Csubb u.
5 Redundancy Results
For logical agents, some of the operators of ARG are redundant or even superflu-
ous. In particular, we show redundancy of the operators replace and addjoin
with respect to the epistemic-doxastic states of (one of) the agents in M!Cbpoq.
We then prove why the operator add should not be considered an option and dis-
cuss what the effect is of the representation of ARG in DEOL to arrive at these
results. In particular, we explore which properties of DEOL enforce complete
reasoning of agents.
Proposition 1 (Redundancy). The adaptation operator replace is already
entailed by the logic. That is, M!Cbpoq is bisimilar to M!Cbpoq;replace. Further-
more, the operators addjoin and refine do not alter the epistemic-doxastic
state of agent a and b, respectively.
Proof. The proof for replace is straightforward as the initial correspondence
(belief) Ca Ě Cb p^ Ca Ď Cbq P Aab is already altered by !Cbpoq in case of a
failure to Ca Ě Cb ^ Ca Ę Cb P A!Cbpoqab . For the proof of addjoin, we compare
the epistemic-doxastic state of agent a before and after the announcement !Cbpoq,
see Figure 4. The proof of refine is analogous.
Note that through the announcement !Cbpoq, agent a does not only revise the
alignment, but also acquires new knowledge. This is because as a model trans-
former !Cbpoq deletes all the worlds in which Cbpoq is false and as a result, agent
a comes to know that it is true. Proposition 1 does not address the adaptation
operator add because applying add may be inconsistent for agent a.
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Proposition 2. The adaptation operator add may be inconsistent with the knowl-
edge and belief of agent a and when it is consistent, add is equivalent to addjoin.
Proof. Assume that !Cbpoq is announced s.t. Doa ‘ Ca with Cb Ď Ca P Aab and
the adaptation operator add is applied. That means that the correspondence
Cb Ď Ca is deleted and Cb Ď Csupa is added where Csupa is the immediate
superclass of Ca in Oa. However, there is no evidence that Csupa is compatible
with object o: it cannot be ensured that Csupa  Doa. In fact, whenever Csupa  Doa
holds Csupa “ CsupDa (as Doa Ď Csupa ) and therefore this operation is equivalent
to addjoin. Whenever Csupa ‘Doa it is contradictory to add Cb Ď Csupa as agent
a knows that Cbpoq and  Csupa poq.
Ď Ď
‘
Da
Ď
Ca
Ď
Ď
‘
o  o
Cb
 o
Ě
Ď
Ě
Ě
Ď
‘
‘
Ď Ď
‘
Da
Ď
Ca
Ď
Ď
‘
o  o
Cb
oĎ
Ğ
Ğ
Ě
Ď
 
 
Fig. 4: The knowledge (solid black)
and belief (dashed red) of agent a
before (above) and after (below) the
announcement !Cbpoq is made.
Proposition 2 is in line with initial predic-
tions and experimental results1: addjoin
shows faster convergence than add be-
cause add may add false correspondences
that later need revision.
In a way, Proposition 1 and Proposi-
tion 2 follow from the representation of
ARG in DEOL. This is because DEOL
enforces a greater reasoning capacity of
agents compared to the original setting
of ARG. In models of DEOL some clo-
sure properties with respect to agents’
epistemic-doxastic state are already em-
bedded as a consequence of the transi-
tive plausibility relations, the definition of
knowledge as truth in all epistemically ac-
cessible worlds and the requirement that
the interpretation function satisfies pC [
DqIw “ CIwXDIw and p CqIw “ ∆zCIw .
Together, the implementation of these
definitions result in agents being complete
reasoners over the domain of interpreta-
tion. Resultingly the adaptation operators
that intend to expand the interpretation
of classes, replace, addjoin (for agent a) and refine (for agent b), naturally
become redundant.
The results presented here rely on the reasoning capacity of agents that are
a consequence of the semantics of DEOL. However, they do not rely on any
specific feature of DEOL. In fact, any logic whose ontology semantics is that
of OWL would warrant it because Doa ‘ Ca, Cbpoq, Doapoq imply that  Capoq
and hence Ca Ę Cb, etc. Hence, the conclusions about the redundancy of the
1Available at https://gforge.inria.fr/plugins/mediawiki/wiki/lazylav/
index.php/20180826-NOOR
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operators replace, addjoin and refine and the possible inconsistency of add
will still hold.
6 Conclusion
We have explored the connection between the adaptation operators in ARG and
the logical dynamics in DEOL where ontologies are modeled as knowledge and
alignments as belief with respect to the plausibility relation. The dynamics of
ARG are achieved through announcements and conservative upgrades in DEOL
and we have shown that the changes induced are purely epistemic-doxastic.
Whereas the adaptation operators only target the incorrect correspondence in
ARG, there is more information available to acquire. This means that the adap-
tation operators have a limitation regarding the information that can be learned
by the agents. Yet, on the other hand, the operators are redundant whenever
their task is only to extend the interpretation of concepts. In DEOL, this ex-
tension is already entailed and causes, together with the closure properties that
follow from the transitivity of the plausibility relations and knowledge as truth
in all accessible worlds, agents to be complete reasoners.
More research is needed to address this matter of complete reasoners. Weak-
ening some of the closure properties might yield different results. The main
question is then, to what extend do the results presented in this paper still hold
and how can these closure properties be weakened to resemble reasoning ca-
pacities closer to the original state of ARG? Likewise, now that the basis for a
logical analysis of ARG is laid, we can explore whether new operators can be
constructed for ARG from the DEOL setting. Exploring more of the properties
and validities of the proposed logic would facilitate this purpose.
The results in this paper are not symmetric: addjoin is redundant for agent
a and not for agent b and vice versa for refine. This is because one agent
may not know the (super-, sub)class that is used to repair the alignment nor
knows the relation between this class and the initial aligned classes. While the
latter is a direct consequence of the design of the gameplay of ARG, the former
was dealt with by requiring the public signature assumption that makes agents
aware of all the available classes. With this assumption the conservative upgrades
rightfully capture the adaptation operators and the results of this paper follow.
However, the public signature assumption does not allow ontologies to dynam-
ically evolve. A more dynamic alternative solution could be to consider partial
valuations. Partial valuations allow agents to extend their vocabularies upon
learning. Compared to the current approach, this approach is a more natural
way to model unawareness of agents because it allows for dynamic open mod-
els [8]. In addition, introducing partial valuations might well lead to a formal
characterization of the features expansion and relaxation as introduced in [6].
These features allow agents to introduce new random correspondences (expan-
sion) or to use shadowed correspondences (relaxation), correspondences that are
(possibly incorrect) yet cannot be detected as such because they do not cause
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any failure [6]. Further research is required to explore the precise potential of
partial valuations for modeling ARG and knowledge representations.
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